The ultimate goal of Yoga

Published in the magazine INDIKA of ELINEPA

An Aristotelian account of samādhi

By Katerina Vasilopoulou-Spitha

Samādhi and the concept of the ultimate goal in Patañjali

In the first of the four chapters of his aphorisms, Patañjali defines yoga as the art of restraining the fluctuations of consciousness (citta-vṛtti-nirodha) (sūtra I.2) through which the individual can attain the knowledge of the Self, his/her soul (puruṣa) (sūtra I.3)¹. This is a goal that presupposes an eightfold (aṣṭāṅga) process of a transformation of consciousness which culminates in the final phase of the meditative practice of samādhi (nirbīja samādhi).

Clearly, the conceptual framework of the word samādhi reflects a teleological perception according to which man is destined to fulfil the innate purpose of his/her existence which is to obtain self-knowledge.

A key tool in this journey of knowledge is the body itself. Just as nature exists to serve the soul (sūtra II.21), also the body, whose structure and function are linked to nature and its qualities, exists to be in the service of the soul. A closer examination of this notion brings to light two major underlying aspects which concern the relationship between purpose and matter.

In particular, this relationship defines that:
a) purpose is the cause of matter rather than matter the cause of purpose, namely the body, conceived as a form of organized matter, exists not for its own sake but for the sake of serving as vehicle of the soul. Consequently,
b) self-realization, as the final end of yoga, is a process that doesn’t exclude but instead entails and presupposes matter.

The concept of entelechy and end (telos) in Aristotle

The concepts of final purpose and realization are also encounter in Aristotle’s theory of form and matter, which he discusses extensively in his works Physics and Metaphysics, and more specifically in his perception of entelechy.

In Physics, Aristotle argues that all actual or real things consist of form and matter, however, form is clearly distinct from matter as it constitutes the specific structure (morphe) of a thing, while matter is the substance (hyle) from which it is composed. Hence, matter is a completely indefinite principle which is in a chaotic, unformed state and becomes specific, something, a thing, only when form, being the defining principle, by acting upon it, gives it a specific structure and shape.

In other words, matter exists only when it takes on a certain form. What makes a piece of wood a piece of furniture? Form. And what would a piece of marble be if not a statue or a column? Nothing but a possibility, a potential thing.

The concept of “potential being” is analyzed by Aristotle in his work Metaphysics, where he defines matter as the ability of a thing to become something, that is, to develop from a state of potentiality (“potential being”) to a state of actuality (“actual being”).

Thus, he connects matter with the concept of “dunamis” (δύναμις), potency, while form with the concept of “energeia” (ἐνέργεια), actuality, and he contends that matter naturally to take a particular form out of need to reach a more complete, “shape-full” state. It is this transformative process, through which matter takes a concrete form, that Aristotle calls ἐντελέχεια ‎(entelékheia, “entelechy”).

The term “entelékheia” (derived from the word télos (“end”) and the verb “ἔχω” ‎(ékhō, “to have”) is used to describe the realization of the form of a thing that results from the action of an inner purpose (télos), in virtue of which it reaches its fullest completion.

Correspondingly, the entelechy (the purpose) of the body is the soul which realizes, “forms” the ability of the body (as subject to the bonds of matter) to exist, that is, to accomplish this particular purpose. This is a view Aristotle postulates in his treatise On the Soul (De Anima), where the soul is for the body both the form (eidos) ² and the purpose (telos) of its existence.

The Aristotelian term “entelechia” is used to describe the realization of the form of a thing that results from the action of an inner purpose, in virtue of which it reaches its fullest completion.

Samādhi as a means of reaching the “actual” state of being (ἐντελεχείᾳ)

The perception that realization is the ultimate goal of matter, which it a priori contains and towards which it naturally aims at, gives rise to the beginning of a dialogue between the philosophy of Patañjali’s yoga and the philosophy of Aristotle.

THE CONCEPT OF REALIZATION AS COMPLETION

For both philosophies, the final cause (οὗ ἕνεκα) of existence is the internal impulse which initiates and directs action, or, in Aristotelian terminology, the mover ³ (κινούν), towards the achievement of the that specific purpose.

In this sense, the practitioner of yoga is, according to the Aristotelian paradigm, in a state of “potential being” which, driven by its inner need to realize its essence, reaches its full completion (entelechy) through samādhi.

Therefore, realization could be understood as completion, the highest point of fullness of existence, which however does not happen automatically but requires, as mentioned above, energy, action. Such action is, in Aristotle’s case, the transition from the state of “potential” being to “actual” being, while in Patañjali’s yoga it is the dissolution of ignorance and the revelation of the true essence of existence.

It is worth noting here that in yoga philosophy, completion, as defined above, is synonymous with self-realization and not with samādhi, which is considered only as the means to its achievement.

The term “self-realization”, which encompasses the entire range of perceptions of the meaning of existence in Patañjali, raises a fundamental issue that constitutes the central point of divergence of the two philosophies and concerns the very concept of the soul and its role in the process of fulfilling “being”.

The practitioner of yoga, according to the Aristotelian paradigm, is in a state of “potential being” which, driven by its inner need to realize its essence, reaches its fullest completion (entelechy) through samādhi.

THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE

“ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ἡ δ’ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια· τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια.”
(Aristotle, On the Soul II, 412a 19-20)

“Necessarily, then, the soul, as the form of a physical body, is a substance that has the potential for life. And this substance is an entelechy. The soul, therefore, is an entelechy of such a body.”⁴

In the above passage of his On the Soul, Aristotle characterizes the soul as the cause and principle of the life of living beings. In doing so, he identifies the soul with natural organic life perceived as a sum of capacities or functions. Behind this idea we can discern the perspective of the biologist and natural scientist Aristotle, who, in his endeavor to explain the phenomenon of life, describes existence in terms of a cause and effect relationship, expressed in the doctrine “I have a soul, therefore, I exist”.

The Aristotelian concept of entelechy is not based on any metaphysical view of the soul, as we would find in Platonic philosophy. Thus, clearly distancing himself from Plato’s dualistic conception, Aristotle considers that soul and body constitute an organic whole, that is, the soul does not exist without the body ⁵ , just as the body does not exist without the soul.

At the opposite end of this view is the concept of self-realization in the Yoga Sūtra. According to Patañjali, existence is not defined in terms of causality but of purposiveness, since the soul is not identified with the phenomenon of life, as in Aristotle, but it is considered to be a distinct entity, liberated from decline and death and, thus, eternal and non-perishable.

The Aristotelian doctrine “I exist because I have a soul” is therefore translated in the Yoga Sūtra as “I exist in order to reach the knowledge of the soul”, thus taking on a purely metaphysical dimension. The different direction taken by Patañjali’s philosophical thought is based on the way he understands the anatomy of existence.

Unlike Aristotle, who believes that the soul as the universal vital principle of the body performs certain functions, such as that of nourishment and reproduction, spatial movement and sensation, as well as intellect and logic, Patañjali advocates that the soul and body do not constitute an indivisible whole, but that the soul, although residing in the body, exists autonomously and independently of it.

Samādhi as a “cosmogenic” event and as another kind of “self-contemplation”

Apart from a deeper comprehension of the teleological nature of samādhi, the aristotelian philosophy offers a field of investigation of another of its aspect. This concerns its role as the point, where existence is being seen as part of the organizing structure and function of the universe, origin and defining principle of which is God (ishvara).

In Patañjali, in particular, God, the universal soul (Paramātman or Puruṣa-viśeṣa), is the creator of the individual soul (jivātman or puruṣa) which is the core of human existence, while in Aristotle the divine mind is considered to participate in human thought.

In De Anima III, Aristotle distinguishes between the passive and the poetic mind. The latter, being immortal and unchanging, is identified with the divine mind that resides in the soul of every human being and functions as a bridge that unites man with God and by extension the world of decay with the eternal and unchanging world ⁶ .

In both cases, therefore, the divine element is an integral part of human existence, as it exists in it either as a mind (poetic mind) or as an essence (individual soul).

Going a step further, Patañjali in sūtra II.45 calls on his disciple to become a partaker of the divine through his complete surrender to God (Īśvara-praṇidhāna) ⁷ . This is also defined as the culminating moment of samādhi which takes on a cosmogenic dimension, since it marks the spiritual connection of man with origin of creation of himself and the world, God.

Samādhi takes on a cosmogonic dimension since it marks the spiritual connection of man with the origin of creation of himself and the world, God.

This does not mean, on the other hand, that the individual, upon reaching samādhi, discards his/her human nature and becomes equal with God, but rather that he/she recognizes the inherent ability to conceive within the context of his/her human, perishable nature himself/herself as a Self (soul) and to complete himself/herself.

During samādhi, the object of meditation is unified with the subject of meditation (the meditator) (sūtra III.3) and then self-awareness is lost, making the presence of only the Self, the soul, dominant.

A similar possibility of self-contemplation that arises as a result of the identification of the substance with its object ⁸ referred to by Aristotle in his work Metaphysics (Book L) with the term “noesis noeseos” (self-thinking nous), when he describes God as a mind (nous) that exists to contemplate continuously and exclusively on itself. The human mind can also reach the level of the divine mind, as he argues, but only at certain moments, since it differs as substance from the former.

In the light of the present discussion, we could consider the experience of samādhi as another kind of “self-contemplation,” a different form of self-thinking exercised by man—and not by God according to the Aristotelian theory—which is achieved not through intellectual functioning but through experiential evidence. And what else is samādhi really than a stage in which the soul can “contemplate” completely and only on the soul?

Notes

[1] In sūtra I.3 Patañjali states that after the mental modifications have been restrained, the soul resides in its true nature. See Kesarcodi-Watson, I. (1982). Samādhi in Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras. Philosophy East and West, 32, 77-90, p. 78

[2] The characterization of the soul as eidos has not the meaning of species or shape but concerns the soul’s role as function and actualization of the physical body. See Ackrill, J. L. (1972-1973). Aristotle’s Definitions of “Psyche”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 73, 119-133, p.122

[3]According to Aristotle, every being is subject to motion, namely change. “In Physics Aristotle speaks about the eternity of motion and from this concept infers also the eternity of time. Motion and time go together, are interrelated”. See Danezis, Μ. Aristotle. The father of West Science

[4]See http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.2.ii.html

[5] Yet, although the soul resides in the body, it is not material. See Durant, W. (2014). The adventure of philosophy: The life and thought of big philosophers, Μetaixmio

[6] See Papadis Ι. D., (1991). The concept of God in Aristotle as “noesis noeseos”, Greek Philosophical Review, 8, 130-142, p.131

[7] See Hariharānanda, Ā. S. (1983). Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali: Containing his yoga aphorisms with Vyasa’s commentary in Sanskrit and a translation with annotations including many suggestions for the practice of yoga, SUNY Press, p.227

[8] According to Elders the expression “noesis noeseos” means that there is no distinction between the subject that thinks and the object of thinking in the same way as there is no distinction between the subject that thinks and the mind as well as between the subject that thinks and the thinking. See Κatzimpouri Ε. (2011). The Βook L of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Concerning the substance of the first unmoved mover (Graduate Thesis), Patras University, p.47

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